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Abstract: This paper is concerned with the relationship between jurisdictional powers and 
economic  and  innovative  capacity  in  the  context  of  sub-national  island  jurisdictions 
(SNIJs). The “jurisdictional powers thesis”, prominent in the present island studies debate, 
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point of departure an ideal-type SNIJ which is characterized by a good match between 
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Introduction  
In  recent  years  the  economic-strategic  potential  of  jurisdictional  powers  has  become  a 
prominent research issue within the discipline of island studies (Baldacchino & Milne, 
2000; Baldacchino, 2006). Various species of insular jurisdictions, ranging from micro-
states to divergent forms of sub-national island jurisdictions (SNIJs), have been analyzed 
and compared in terms of their economic success (Armstrong et al., 1998; Armstrong & 
Read, 2000; Bertram & Poirine, 2007). The result is a growing number of taxonomies and 
classification schemes that reflect the existence of a multiplicity of political and economic 
configurations amongst the global population of islands (Watts, 2008) and, one might add, 
the truly entrepreneurial capacity of many an island community (Bertram & Poirine, 2007). 
Economically successful islands are not just the subject of “a temporary spell of good 
fortune” (Baldacchino, 2000: 68), but should also be considered as sites where intelligent 
strategic  agents  make  creative  and  innovative  use  of  their  material  and  immaterial 
resources, including their jurisdictional powers. Baldacchino & Milne (2000) maintain that 
such a “resourcefulness of jurisdiction” cannot be ignored if we are to better understand the 
modus operandi of a multitude of successful island economies. Criticizing the traditionalist 
“volatile economy” approach to island studies, they state:   A. Karlsson 
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“Our research suggests that this lacuna in economic theory needs to be addressed so 
that constitutional resources, particularly in small states, are seen and measured for 
the large reservoirs of economic potentiality that they really are. Legal personality 
permits  jurisdictions  of  various  degrees  of  autonomy  to  act  for  themselves  in 
economic strategy and planning, and to use their powers most intelligently to build 
more diversified, self-reliant economic communities” (ibid.: 8).   
The  ‘resourcefulness  of  jurisdiction’  thesis,  along  with  the  conceptualization  of  island 
communities as strategic agents (rather than as victims of unfortunate circumstances), has 
inspired a comparative study of the three North European (Nordic) SNIJs: Åland, Faroe 
Islands and Greenland.
1  
Thanks  to  an  interpretative,  naturalistic  approach  and  qualitative,  in-depth  empirical 
research  methods,
2  this  study  explores  various  meanings  and  expressions  of  political 
autonomy  and  economic  capacity,  both  historical  and  contemporary,  in  the  three  SNIJ 
contexts. Each SNIJ has been approached as a case or a bounded system. Based upon the 
empirical  data  collected,  the  study  has  constructed  three  alternative  configurations  of 
jurisdictional powers and economic capacity. These configurations capture the empirically 
experienced inter-relations between jurisdictional powers and economic capacity in each of 
the  three  SNIJ  cases;  they  also  indicate  which  strategic  and  dynamic  challenges  the 
significant actors of each SNIJ might face.   
From a political economy perspective, it has been suggested that SNIJs represent “the best 
of all possible worlds” and that “these island jurisdictions deploy many of the benefits 
associated with political sovereignty while they are delegating responsibilities to, enjoying 
the security provided by, and reaping the material benefits of, remaining in association 
with a larger, and typically  richer, patron” (Baldacchino, 2006: 860). This and similar 
statements suggest that the transition from a SNIJ to a fully fledged state would, at least 
from an economic angle, not be a commendable path of development. The partnership with 
the metropole is, in itself, a most important resource which should be protected, managed, 
and exploited (Baldacchino & Milne, 2008b).   
This idea of a SNIJ comes close to a Weberian ideal-type construct (Weber 1947/1969). 
The very purpose of an ideal-type is to offer a ‘pure’ (abstract and logical) typification of 
an empirical phenomenon and a natural conceptual starting-point for empirical endeavours. 
Deviations from the ideal-type should be identified in various empirical settings so as to 
accumulate an increasingly more differentiated (and, simultaneously, deeper) knowledge 
of the phenomenon: in this case, the SNIJ. The ideal-type SNIJ suggests that jurisdictional 
                                                           
1 The study was initiated and has been administered by Statistics and Research Åland (ÅSUB). It was funded 
by The Nordic Council of Ministers as well as by Nordregio, Stockholm. Four individual reports:  Karlsson 
(2007a, 2007b, 2008) and van Well (2008) (the last one on Bornholm) and a final one, summarizing the 
findings of the individual studies (Karlsson et al., 2009) have been published. The authors of these reports 
express their deep gratitude to the funding institutes. 
2  The  in-depth  case  studies  of  the  three  SNIJs  are  based  upon  22  personal  interviews  with  significant 
political, economic and administrative actors. The interviews were conducted: (1) in Åland in January 2007; 
(2) in the Faroes in March 2007; and (3) in Greenland in November 2007. Extensive documentary studies 
have supplemented the empirical research.                             Åland, Faroes and Greenland as Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
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powers are resourceful; that they represent a true resource in the strategic and economic 
development  of  an  island  community.  Referring  to  the  configurative  “realities”  of  the 
study, one might say that the ideal-type SNIJ is characterized by a perfect match between 
jurisdictional powers and economic capacity: that is, jurisdictional powers can be fully and 
intelligently utilized so as to match the state and current potential of the economy.  
This paper reports the results of confronting the ideal-type SNIJ with three different island 
situations and suggests that there are still some important lessons to be learnt about the 
interrelations between jurisdictional powers and economic capacity. There is not always a 
perfect match between the two: either the jurisdictional powers are not enough to be truly 
resourceful; or the economic capacity is such that formal jurisdictional powers cannot be 
fully  utilized.  Still,  when  there  is  a  match,  important  cross-fertilization  and  synergies 
occur.  
By means of empirical illustrations and configurative representations, this paper aims to 
offer a differentiated picture of the complex politico-economic realities of SNIJs. Before 
some pivotal points of these empirical realities can be described and represented the two 
principal constructs – jurisdictional powers and economic capacity – need to be defined.   
  
Jurisdictional Powers and Economic Capacity: The Constructs and their Meanings  
It should be clear by now that the two most important analytical tools of this study are the 
constructs of jurisdictional powers and economic capacity. With these tools the empirical 
realities of the three SNIJs have been captured, given meaning and typified. In the process, 
the  meanings  of  the  constructs  themselves  have  being  changed  and  new  elements  of 
definition  have  been  introduced.  The  journey  that  the  constructs  have  undertaken,  of 
course, reflects the differentiated empirical experiences that have been made in this study.  
Jurisdictional powers  
Following politico-economic convention, this study considers both de jure and de facto 
powers as significant components of the overall jurisdictional powers of a SNIJ. The de 
jure dimension consists in what is allowed by the statute books: the formal, regulatory, 
juridical and constitutional room for political manoeuvre. The de facto dimension includes 
those  additional  strategic  and  administrative  skills,  customary  powers  as  well  as  those 
socio-political relationships and networks upheld by the significant political actors and 
which may not be defined at law (Karlsson et al., 2009).  
The  skills  that  the  political  system  of  a  SNIJ  exhibits  in  handling  its  own  affairs  are 
basically a question of learning, or of accumulating collective knowledge (Maskell et al., 
1998; Kitson et al., 2004). The formal constitution might, or might not, offer opportunities 
for accumulating such critical administrative knowledge and, in the end, of developing 
more  skilful  policy-makers.  Political  entrepreneurship  and  innovative  development 
strategies do not exist in a socio-political vacuum but are based upon the specific learning 
opportunities that the local constitutional context offers. The degree of dynamism built into A. Karlsson 
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a formal constitution affects the de facto jurisdictional powers by the means of learning. 
But just as important as the learning opportunities are the social relationships and networks 
of the SNIJ élite system (Baldacchino, 2005). The relationship capital (Kitson et al., 2004) 
which the leading actors are – or are not – in the possession of is constituted by both intra-
regional  and  external  relations.  Most  important  among  the  latter  are  those  with  the 
metropole (Baldacchino & Milne, 2008a). The capacity to both accumulate and mobilize a 
relationship capital is critical to the de facto jurisdictional powers of the SNIJ.  
In  the  empirical  process  of  the  study,  it  became  clear  that  intra-regional  roles  and 
relationships, rooted in the political culture of the region, were key to explaining the de 
facto jurisdictional powers of that region. A region can be conceptualized as a community 
of  political  practices  (Wenger,  1998)  that  incorporate  institutionalized  patterns  of 
interactions between the political élite and – what is important here – the business sector of 
that  region.  To  the  extent  that  the  political  élite  assumes  only  a  “junior  partner”  role 
(Sejerstedt,  1996)  relative  to  the  business  sector  in  the  economic  development  of  the 
region,  it  also  becomes  more  reluctant  to  take  upon  itself  a  significant  entrepreneurial 
responsibility. Economic strategies are left to the business sector to decide upon and to 
implement. The tools of political economy, although at hand, are not given a significant 
role in the processes of policy-making. The opposite may be just as true. Then, the political 
culture of the region gives the political actors a more prominent role to assume in the 
development  of  economic  strategies  and,  consequently,  policy-instruments  become 
important in the moulding of the economic future of the SNIJ.  Basically, the political 
culture of a SNIJ touches upon the form of the overall economic system that it exhibits 
(Whitley, 1999; Fellman et al., 2008).  
Even more important to the national mobilization of a SNIJ - and the resourcefulness of 
jurisdictional  powers  -  are  both  the  collective  self-confidence  and  the  identification 
patterns of its citizens (Srebrnik, 2000; Asheim, 2004). If significant groups of citizens 
identify themselves with the metropole rather than with their local community, there is a 
tendency  to  ignore  the  resourcefulness  of  local,  formal,  jurisdictional  instruments. 
Financial and psychological reliance upon the patron also tends to hinder the development 
of  a  strong  localized  (and  proto  nationalist?)  self-confidence:  essential  to  a  de  facto 
mobilization of jurisdictional powers.  
While the de jure jurisdictional powers rest upon a formal constitutional platform, the de 
facto  jurisdictional  powers  reside  in  processes  of  learning,  in  social  relationships  and 
networks, in political cultures and in a collective feeling of self-confidence. Needless to 
say,  the  de  facto  jurisdictional  powers  of  a  SNIJ  add  real  powers  beyond  the  formal 
constitution.  
  
Economic capacity  
Economic capacity is a complex and dynamic  phenomenon the elements of which are 
highly  interconnected.  As  suggested  by  Baldacchino  &  Milne  (2000),  the  economic 
capacity of a SNIJ is defined as the abilities (and skills) of the significant actors of a region 
to utilize existing and new resources in an efficient and innovative manner in order to pro-                            Åland, Faroes and Greenland as Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
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actively deal with external and internal challenges and crises, as well as with external and 
internal  possibilities  and  opportunities.  Basically,  the  economic  capacity  of  a  SNIJ 
concerns its long-term ability to produce wealth and welfare for its citizens.  
A key element of the economic capacity of a region is the existence of a core competency 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1998; Boye, 1999). Specialized economies have long been at the very 
core of economic discourse and the concept of core competency rests, harmoniously, in 
that discourse. This concept focuses not only upon the level of specialization of a regional 
economy  but  also  upon  its  inherent  potential  for  growth  and  (related)  diversification. 
Moreover, it is indicative of the sustainable competitive advantages that certain specialized 
regions  maintain  over  time  (Porter,  2003;  Coenen  &  Asheim,  2006).  A  strong  core 
competency is the very platform of a strong regional cluster and is, as such, also the carrier 
of cultural and identity-related elements (Paasi, 1986).  
The  identification  of  a  core  competency  requires  both  historical  and  longitudinal 
perspectives.  A  core  competency  is  not  developed  overnight.  Significant  to  its 
identification is a (more or less visible) existence of divergent (but still related) economic 
branches (industries and firms) that thrive from an association with the core competency. 
The more solid and robust these branches, the stronger the core competency; the greater 
the  number  of  identifiable  branches,  the  stronger  the  innovative  capacity  of  the  core 
competency  (Karlsson,  2007a).  Innovative  capacity  refers  to  a  pro-active  and  creative 
exploitation  of  various  resources;  the  key  resource  being  the  core  competency  itself 
(ibid.).  
Innovative  capacity  is  an  essential  element  of  gaining  and  maintaining  competitive 
advantage.  Small  economies  are,  in  this  gaining  and  maintaining  endeavour,  critically 
dependent  upon  their  differentiation  skills  (economies  of  scope).  However,  they  rarely 
have the resources necessary to develop sophisticated research and development (R&D) 
systems.  Instead,  innovation  by  imitation  is  a  much  more  preferred,  and  successful, 
strategy  (ibid.).  Being  inspired  by  new  ideas  abroad,  bringing  them  safely  home  and 
adapting them to the conditions of the local context is what the innovative behaviour of a 
small  island  society  is  often  about.  The  local  entrepreneur  is  often  a  cosmopolitan: 
scrutinizing, converting and translating ideas from abroad into local products and services 
which can be offered to various markets, among them those markets from which the ideas 
were originally borrowed.  
Also central to the economic capacity of a SNIJ is the human capital factor (Kitson et al., 
2004).  A  core  competency  cannot  be  maintained  without  unique  skills  and  without  a 
dynamic  learning  capacity.  The  existence  of  a  core  competency  is  equivalent  to  many 
people sharing a certain (competitive) knowledge (Karlsson, 2007a; 2007b). The diffusion 
of critical knowledge is therefore crucial if a core competency is to survive over time. This 
is not just a question of the formal educational system but also one of everyday knowledge 
and cultural transmission (Asheim, 2004). Still, the formal educational system may have 
much to contribute. Educating young people at home is likely to reduce the risk of losing 
them. It also means that the identity element of a core competency can be maintained and 
strengthened (Karlsson, 2007a; 2007b). A. Karlsson 
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The Three Nordic SNIJs – Jurisdictional Powers and Economic Capacity at Work  
The three Nordic SNIJs, the subjects of this study,  exhibit both similar and  dissimilar 
features. The following table offers some general data (Table 1).  
Table 1 - Åland Islands, Faroe Islands and Greenland: General Data.  
   Åland Islands  Faroe Islands  Greenland 
Area (km
2)  1,552 (comprising 
6,757 islands) 
1,396 (comprising 17 
islands) 
2,166,086 (80 % of which 
is ice and glaciers) 
Population  27,153  48,433  56,462 
Population/km
2  17.8  34.7  0.14 (of area free of ice) 
GDP per capita  33,100 Euros  33,000 Euros  25,200 Euros 
Jurisdictional 
Status 
Autonomy within 
Republic of Finland 
Autonomy within 
Kingdom of Denmark 
Autonomy within 
Kingdom of Denmark 
EU Status  Member  Not a member  Not a member 
Parliament  Lagtinget 
(30 members) 
Logting 
(33 members) 
Landstinget 
(31 members) 
  
Source: Karlsson et al. (2009:118-121).  
  
The Case of Åland: Delimited Jurisdictional Powers and Strong Economic Capacity  
Jurisdictional powers  
Åland has, since 1921, enjoyed Home Rule within the Republic of Finland. Åland was, and 
still is, Swedish: in language, culture and identity. Formerly, Åland and Finland constituted 
the Eastern part of the Swedish Realm from the 10
th century and up until 1809. The Eastern 
part of the realm was then lost to Russia and became a Grand Duchy within the Russian 
Empire.  The  Russian  revolution  in  1917  and  Finland´s  subsequent  declaration  of 
independence mobilized the Ålanders who, at that time, were experiencing a real threat to 
their Swedish identity. An unofficial referendum, held in 1919, clearly revealed the wish of 
the population of Åland: a reunion with Sweden. Contrary to this, the League of Nations – 
assigned to solve the so-called “Åland question” – decided that Åland should remain part 
of Finland but with a certain degree of autonomy (Barros, 1968).   
The Autonomy Act of Åland guarantees the preservation of the Swedish language and the 
Swedish culture but gives the Ålanders a very restricted influence over economic issues 
(Lindstrom, 1997; 2001; Karlsson, 2007a). The Act has been revised twice, in 1953 and 
1979, but Åland has still not, except on the municipal level, a taxation competency of its 
own. The Ålanders pay their state tax to Finland. Annually, 0.45 % of the total revenues of 
the state of Finland (except loans) are paid back to Åland as a lump sum. The revenues of 
the community of Åland are, consequently, not controlled by the Home Rule authorities.                               Åland, Faroes and Greenland as Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
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The de jure jurisdictional powers are delimited especially if one is to compare with other 
autonomies  around  the  world  (Lindstrom,  2000;  Watts,  2008).  Compared  to  the 
constitutional status of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, that of Åland has been rather 
static. The two revisions that have been made have not contributed significantly either to a 
political or to an economic dynamism. They have not meaningfully strengthened the de 
jure jurisdictional powers of Åland. Politics is basically the same and the politicians have 
had few opportunities to learn a more sophisticated type of policy.  
The  Parliament  of  Åland  (Lagtinget)  has  legislative  competences  within  areas  such  as 
education, culture and the preservation of old monuments, health and medical services, 
environment  protection,  promotion  of  industry,  internal  communications,  municipal 
administration, police services, the postal services and radio/TV broadcasting. The laws of 
the state of Finland regulate foreign affairs, civil and penal law, courts of justice and, as 
mentioned,  customs  and  taxation.  Åland  has  the  right  to  elect  its  own  member  to  the 
Parliament of Finland, but is not represented on the EU Parliament. Furthermore, Åland is 
a neutral and de-militarized zone which means that no armed forces or fortifications are 
allowed  on  the  islands.  A  special  feature  of  the  Home  Rule  of  Åland  is  the  right  of 
domicile - a right which is necessary to possess if one is to acquire land or property, run a 
business or even vote in general elections. The right of domicile is naturally possessed by 
Ålanders born in the islands. Foreigners living in the islands may apply for this right, but 
only after five years of permanent residence. Consequently, the ownership of land and 
water is altogether an issue of the Åland government (Landskapsregeringen).   
The very idea of a partnership (Baldacchino & Milne, 2008a) which prevails in today´s 
debate on multi-level governance (Bache & Flinders, 2004) is not much discussed in either 
Helsinki or Mariehamn. The Ålandic relationship with Finnish authorities has, from time 
to time, been rather strained: a number of disputes concerning territorial, economic and 
cultural issues have occurred. An ongoing dispute concerns the Ålanders´ very right to 
communicate  with  Finnish  authorities  in  their  own  language:  Swedish.  “Guarding  and 
protecting  the  autonomy”  has  become  the  predominant  attitude  taken  by  the  political 
system of Åland (Karlsson, 2007a).   
An ongoing dispute concerns the representation of Åland in the Parliament of the European 
Union. As was mentioned earlier, Åland does not have an EU representative of its own but 
is represented by Finland. Two recent decisions of the EU Parliament in particular, most 
unpopular among Ålanders, concern the abolition of the (for many decades almost sacred) 
spring aquatic bird shooting, and the consumption of snuff (economically, a very important 
tax free sales product of the ferry industry of Åland). These decisions have mobilized the 
Ålanders in a struggle for a parliamentary seat of their own. Finland has – by referring to 
the size of the nation of Finland, the limited number of seats that Finland holds in the EU 
Parliament, and the small population of Åland – refused to seriously consider this matter. 
However, when the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon came to the fore, the Parliament of 
Åland – in its negotiations with Finland - threatened not to ratify it. Whether such a refusal 
by the Åland Parliament actually could affect the overall process of ratification became an 
issue, even in some European newspapers. It appeared that the status of the Parliament of 
Åland, relative to the status of the Parliament of Finland, was not absolutely clear; and A. Karlsson 
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Finland, frustrated by the obstinacy of the Ålanders, even suggested that it might somehow 
exclude Åland from the EU. This dispute, however, came to an end late in 2009 when the 
Self-Government Policy Committee (Självstyrelsepolitiska Nämnden) of the Parliament of 
Åland voted in favour of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty. In the process, the Ålanders were 
granted the right to speak in matters concerning Åland in the EU Court. Still, the issue of 
an EU parliamentary seat has a high priority among the Ålanders and will, probably, be 
activated anew should another unpopular EU parliamentary decision be taken.   
If one considers demanding processes like these in the context of the relationship between 
Åland and Finland, the de facto jurisdictional powers cannot be regarded as a significant 
resource to the benefit of Åland’s economy (Lindström, 2001; Karlsson, 2007a).  
Economic capacity  
The  economy  of  Åland  has,  historically,  been  strong  and  stable  compared  with  other 
regions  of  similar  status  (Ackrén,  2005;  Baldacchino,  2006).  At  the  core  of  its  strong 
economic  capacity  is  a  core  competency  based  upon  nautical,  technical,  logistical  and 
shipping management skills which has been nurtured for over 700 years. The shipping 
industry has, at its height, represented more than 50 % of the Åland GDP and has, through 
continual spinoffs, created the largest maritime cluster of the Northern Baltic (Lindström, 
2002).  
The shipping industry has demonstrated excellent adaptation skills and innovative capacity 
over time and has come to operate, successfully, in various segments of the international 
transport  market.  Many  a  successful  business  concept  has  been  imported  from  abroad 
(Kåhre & Kåhre, 1988; Tudéer, 1993; Harberg, 1995). The diversity of the industry has 
had a profound impact on its steady progress during the last 150 years. Smaller, maritime 
shipping  companies  operating  over  shorter  distances  have  come  to  operate  alongside 
bigger  tanker  and  ferry  companies.  This  diversity  has  balanced  contradictory  business 
cycles and contributed to the ability of the shipping industry to maintain its leading role 
within the economic life of Åland (Lindström, 2002; Karlsson, 2007a).  
Of course, the maritime cluster of Åland has not been able to avoid the recessions that 
periodically challenge the international shipping industry. Over 1975-1985, the shipping 
industry  of  Åland  went  through  a  dramatic  structural  change  that  left  the  fleet  much 
reduced in number (Harberg, 1995). Simultaneously, prominent ship owners moved their 
fleets to such countries as Bahamas, Bermuda and Cyprus. The drastic down-turn of the 
merchant  fleet  was,  however,  balanced  by  the  up-turn  of  the  ferry  traffic  –  now  the 
cornerstone of the shipping industry of Åland. The business concept that developed the 
ferry industry was borrowed from abroad (more precisely, from the Channel) and adapted 
to  the  conditions  of  the  Baltic  (Svensson,  1986).  Innovation  by  imitation  has  been  a 
preferred strategy and the cosmopolitan attitude that lies behind it has come naturally to the 
entrepreneurs of this shipping milieu (Kåhre & Kåhre, 1988).  
Åland society has, for a long time, been a truly maritime community. The maritime core 
competency has even been the carrier of a seafarer identity that, for more than a 100 years,                             Åland, Faroes and Greenland as Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
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was practically taken for granted (Kåhre & Kåhre, 1988). The Ålanders were, after all, 
seafarers. From the 1860s and up until the First
 World War, ownership of the shipping 
companies was widely dispersed. Almost every family had at least some shares in the 
many companies that had not only Mariehamn but also some minor municipalities as their 
headquarters (Papp, 1971). This fostered a widespread and diffuse knowledge of shipping 
and shipping management. There was also never a shortage of financial capital and the 
financial risks were secure. The first Ålandic bank was established in 1919 and the first 
marine  insurance  company  was  set  up  in  1938.  With  these  two  service  providers,  the 
maritime cluster began to grow (Lindström, 2002).  
The (marine) insurance and finance companies are even today, together with a growing 
number  of  IT-companies,  those  that  contribute  most to  the  growth  of  the  economy  of 
Åland (ÅSUB, 2009). They are servicing both the Ålandic and some Nordic/European 
markets and have an extended internationalization as a prime strategic goal. Other service 
providers  such  as  consultancy  firms  focusing  upon  security  and  transport  efficiency 
(logistics)  have  been  established.  Tourism  and  trade  have  benefitted  from  the  efficient 
transportation facilities that the ferry companies provide, and those wholesale companies 
that offer tax-free products that are essential in upholding the ferry traffic between Sweden 
and Finland have flourished (ibid.). The educational system has developed close to the core 
of  the  maritime  cluster  and  produced  seafarers  in  great  demand  by  the  international 
shipping industry for almost 100 years (Harberg, 1995).  
This success story of the Ålandic shipping industry – and consequently of the economy of 
Åland – has in recent years, however, become more problematic. A fiercer competition 
coming from shipping companies operating in more favourable institutional settings – in 
The Netherlands, Belgium and Germany – has challenged the Ålandic merchant fleet’s 
market  share.  Contrary  to  the  recommendations  of  the  EU  Commission  (2003,  2004), 
Finland – with the taxation instrument in its hands – has not prioritized shipping among its 
industrial policies (Karlsson, 2007c). The tonnage tax, today a natural policy measure in 
many  EU  countries  with  maritime  interests,  is  still  only  (reluctantly)  discussed  by  the 
policy-makers of Finland. This laggard attitude has had a negative impact upon the renewal 
of the Åland merchant fleet, as well as upon the entrepreneurial climate within its shipping 
cluster: its youngest shipping company is now more than 30 years old.  
Just  as  serious  a  strategic  challenge  to  the  shipping  industry  is  the  problem  of  the 
recruitment of personnel. With the ongoing dissolution of the maritime cluster identity 
(Lindström et al., 2009) the attractiveness of the industry is declining among young people 
in the region. An expansion of the industry, as one would expect to find in the light of the 
growing transportation market of the Baltic, is thus hindered. The educational system is 
constantly under fire from the industry and conflicts between the educational system and 
the shipping companies, not observable in the past, are separating the two former cluster 
partners. The industry, thus, prefers personnel with hands-on knowledge and emphasizes 
educational programs that are skill-based with more practical ‘learning-by-doing’ while the 
educational system stresses international standards and more theoretical knowledge.  A. Karlsson 
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A third problem to the Åland economy is the moving out of parts of the ferry fleet from 
Finland to Sweden. This strategic move, motivated by cost efficiency reasons, negatively 
affects  the  economies  of  the  16  municipalities  of  Åland.  The  government  and  the 
parliament of Åland can do little to prevent this development since they do not have the 
necessary competencies or political instruments (Karlsson, 2007c). Lobbying with Helsinki 
– for the sake of the Åland shipping industry – has, so far, proved unsuccessful.  
Jurisdictional  powers  and  economic  capacity  –  problematic  interrelations  and  an 
imperfect match  
The  strategic  challenges  presently  confronting  the  Åland  economy  clearly  reveal  the 
deficiencies of the “jurisdictional tool box”. The question is: can Åland rely solely upon its 
existing relations with Finland in order to protect the core of its economy - the shipping 
industry? Or has the time come to revise The Autonomy Act, with a view to expand the 
political room of manoeuvre, and so reducing the threats to the economy? The political 
culture  of  Åland  is  loath  to  struggle  for  a  strengthening  of  the  regional  jurisdictional 
powers.  Home  Rule  authorities  have,  historically,  been  reluctant  to  interfere  with  the 
business sector: maybe because they have not had the relevant institutional instruments in 
their hands. One might even say that in the past there has not been any particular need for 
an economic policy: the shipping cluster has carried the economy of Åland. The situation 
today is different and challenges the local political culture. Is the Åland political system 
ready to assume “a senior partner role” in the development of the Åland economy? That 
would certainly require some kind of development, of a kind that the jurisdictional system 
of the past has not produced. Being static, rather than dynamic, the Home Rule Act has not 
fostered that political entrepreneurship that is now seriously required.  
The Case of the Faroe Islands: Strong Jurisdictional Powers and Strong Economic 
Capacity  
Jurisdictional powers  
The Home Rule Act of the Faroe Islands is of a younger date than Åland’s Act. In 1948, 
and in the aftermath of the Second World War, the time had come to formally manifest the 
long discussed autonomy of the Faroese people. The war years were, as many analysts 
have noted, among the most successful in the history of the islands. Isolated from Denmark 
(which  was  occupied  by  Germany  during  the  Second  World  War),  the  islands  (then 
occupied by Britain) had to take care of their own administration and handle their own 
affairs. A new political and business entrepreneurship emerged. When the war came to an 
end the Faroese people could rightfully claim “we can do it” (Hoydal, 2000; Debes, 2001). 
This national self-confidence has since been maintained, and even strengthened, by both 
the upheavals and the recessions of the economy.  
The Home Rule Act of the Faroe Islands has, from its very beginning, possessed an in-built 
dynamism. This means that the local legislative assembly (Logting) has been able to take 
over the responsibility of some agreed upon (and listed) legislative areas from the state of 
Denmark  on  a  continual  basis.  The  very  idea  behind  the  development  of  the  Faroese                             Åland, Faroes and Greenland as Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
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autonomy is that “those who decide should pay”, meaning “you decide when  you can 
afford it” (Debes, 2001). This means that the Faroe Islands already controlled their own 
revenues  in  1948:  municipal  as  well  as  national  taxes.  It  also  means  that  those 
administrative areas that are financially burdensome are those that have been left in the 
hands of the Danish Realm: for example, the health care system (the responsibility for 
which  was  not  taken  over  until  1977)  and  the  educational  system  (which,  with  a  few 
exceptions, remained ‘Danish’ until 2002) (Karlsson, 2007b).  
The legislative and administrative areas that were to be “automatically” transferable (by a 
sole decision by the Faroese parliament) were, in 1948, listed on the so-called A-list, an 
appendix to the Home Rule Act while those that would require negotiations between the 
parliament of Denmark and that of the Faroe Islands were listed on the B-list. Legislative 
and  administrative  areas  that  would  remain,  exclusively,  in  the  hands  of  the  state  of 
Denmark were: foreign policy, monetary policy, civil and penal laws and national security 
and defence (Lyck, 1997).   
Over the years, new areas have been added to the A-list in revised versions of the Home 
Rule Act. As late as 2005, 25 new areas were listed. When all these are finally transferred 
to the administration of the Faroese authorities, the Faroe Islands might be said to stand on 
the threshold of sovereignty (Ackrén, 2006). The de jure jurisdictional powers  are, no 
doubt, strong and they have been gradually strengthened.  
The overall responsibility of certain policy areas of the administration of the Faroe Islands 
is shared by Torshavn and Copenhagen. In praxis, however, the state of Denmark exerts a 
minimum of influence over administrative areas that even legally belong to Copenhagen. 
Annually, a generous monetary lump sum is transferred from Denmark to the Faroe Islands 
to cover the Danish part of those expenditures over which there is a mutual responsibility 
(Statistics Faroe Islands, 2006). The way this system operates strengthens the de facto 
jurisdictional powers of the Faroese (Karlsson, 2007b).   
The  pragmatism  (Baldacchino  &  Milne,  2008a)  that,  in  general,  permeates  Denmark´s 
relationship with the Faroe Islands is seen particularly in foreign policy. Although foreign 
policy is, formally, an exclusive Danish responsibility, in practice, the Faroe Islands run a 
foreign office of their own. They are represented in a number of North Atlantic Fishery 
Associations and have been given the right to sign their own bi-lateral fishery agreements. 
When it comes to multi-lateral agreements, Denmark is the signing authority but a Faroese 
representative  is  present  at  the  occasion  of  signing  (Statistics  Faroe  Islands,  2006). 
Furthermore, the Faroe Islands have their own “embassies” in Brussels and in Reykjavik 
and an attaché in London. The Faroese flag flies outside these “embassy” buildings.   
Although the relationship between Denmark and the Faroese Islands has been challenged 
on several occasions over their (long) mutual history (Harhoff, 1993; Debes, 2001), the 
partnership has overall been beneficial to the Faroe Islands – and not only financially. The 
logic underlying the gradual transfer of legislative and administrative competencies is one 
that also fosters political entrepreneurship and administrative knowledge. Gradually, the 
political élite of the islands has come to accumulate a stock of critical knowledge which A. Karlsson 
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has also strengthened their self-confidence (Karlsson, 2007b). This knowledge, and the 
accompanying self-confidence, has been essential to the political entrepreneurship that, 
during the last 10 years, has come to play a significant role in the economic development 
of the Faroe Islands. A combination of de jure and de facto jurisdictional powers has had a 
positive effect upon the economic performance of the islands (ibid.).  
Economic capacity  
Like that of Åland, the economy of the Faroe Islands is strongly based around the sea. The 
Faroese  are  not,  however,  primarily  seafarers  but  fishers  (even  though  their  seafarer 
competencies should not be ignored). The fishery cluster started to develop in the middle 
of the 19
th century when a long lasting Danish trade monopoly was abolished and the 
Faroese were liberated from a quasi-feudal system binding them to farming (Olafsson, 
2000). From then on, an economic capacity – remarkable for a seemingly isolated part of 
the Northern Atlantic – has continued to develop; today, the Faroe Islands are on the top of 
the economic Nordic autonomy list (Nordic Statistical Yearbook, 2006). The Faroe Islands 
have, in fact, never – despite their geographical position – been isolated. A cosmopolitan 
attitude  continues  to  permeate  Faroese  society  and  many  a  good  idea  has  come  from 
abroad; the Shetlands, historically, being a particular inspirer (West, 1972; Debes, 2001).  
The economic capacity of the Faroe Islands began to take shape in the 1860s (Olafsson, 
2000). A core competency was developed which made the Faroe Islands, just in a few 
years  time,  an  important  exporter  of  fish  products  (mainly  dried  and  salted  cod)  to 
European markets. The early fishery industry was mainly coastal and based on various 
banks outside the archipelago (West, 1972; Debes, 2001). The boats and the techniques at 
hand  hindered  the  development  of  a  more  lucrative  deep-sea  fishery.  But  in  1871,  a 
Faroese fishery company bought its first (second hand) sloop from the Shetlands and after 
that a fishery industry started to develop. With these bigger ships the attractive waters of 
Iceland and Greenland became accessible and a growing number of Faroese joined the 
annual expeditions to these waters. New and more efficient techniques were developed, 
resulting  in  a  fishery  competency  developing  into  a  core  competency.  A  professional 
identity  (the  identity  of  being  a  fisher)  became  a  national  identity  -  the  Faroe  Islands 
became a nation of fishers (Hoydal, 2000) which furthered the diffusion of knowledge in 
the Faroese community. The recruitment of personnel was an easy task and it was a natural 
choice for young Faroese to join the fishery fleet (West, 1972).  
Over the last 150 years, the fishery industry has become more differentiated and has come 
to include the whole value chain (Morkore, 1993; Olafsson, 2000). The processing of fish 
products is, of course, a more lucrative business than just selling raw fish and the fillet 
factories soon came to play a major role in adding value to the fish products. The finance 
and service providing sectors developed as well and gradually – in the middle of the 20
th 
century – a cluster was formed (Karlsson, 2007b).  
The economy of the Faroe Islands is highly dependent upon its exports. Well over 90% of 
what is produced on the islands is sold on international markets (Statistics Faroe Islands, 
2006). This dependency, of course, makes the economy vulnerable in more than one sense.                             Åland, Faroes and Greenland as Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
  151
International competition is fierce and prices are regularly changing. The flexibility of the 
production system is crucial to the profitability of the fishery industry as well as to its 
cluster partners. Building that flexibility has not been an easy task. Investments in trawlers 
and factories represent a heavy financial burden and running them smoothly and efficiently 
is critical to profitability.  For  a political system that traditionally has played a “senior 
partner” role – such as that of the Faroe Islands – it is natural to intervene when things do 
not run smoothly. This was the case in the 1990s when the bank crisis of the Faroe Islands 
became front page news all over the world. That crisis, however, proved to be an important 
period of learning for both the political and industrial élites of the islands.   
The crisis started with the nationalization of the seas in the 1970s (Hoydal, 2000; Debes, 
2001). An important consequence of the nationalization policy was that the free fishery on 
the world seas was prohibited. Free fishery quotas were only allowed inside a 200 nautical 
mile zone – quotas that were up to the nations to decide. For the deep-sea fishery fleet of 
the Faroe Islands, this meant returning home to coastal waters where a fierce competition 
arose.  Conflicts  between  the  small,  regionally  based  fishery  companies  and  the  big, 
internationally oriented corporations became regular and the authorities tried to solve some 
of them by a generous subsidy policy. The Home Rule authorities became the guarantors 
for an increasing number of private loans that were taken at home and abroad. The fishery 
fleet became more and more efficient (and internationally competitive) but then, practically 
overnight, the  cod disappeared  from Faroese waters. By far the most important export 
product, the disappearance of the cod proved to be a disaster. The fishery fleet had a huge 
over-capacity and the loans that had built that fleet could not be re-paid. The fisheries and 
the fillet factories started to go bankrupt. At that time the Faroese authorities totally lost 
control over the subsidy system. The crisis turned into a bank crisis and then into a national 
disaster. Denmark, concerned with its international reputation, lent the Faroese Home Rule 
authorities  huge  sums  of  money  resulting  in  a  Faroese  debt  of  7,300  million  DKK 
(US$1.4bn) (or 167,000 DKK - US$32,000 per Faroese) to Denmark (Hoydal, 2000). In 
1992, the Home Rule authorities were put under the administration of the government of 
Denmark; for the first time, Denmark used its legal rights to recall the autonomy given to 
the Faroe Islands in 1948.   
The Faroese banking crisis represents an important lesson; but more interesting than the 
crisis itself is the remarkable recovery that the economy of the islands underwent between 
1994 and 1998. The key lesson learnt is perhaps that a sound financial policy is not based 
upon excessive subsidies but upon more balanced fiscal policies. Another lesson concerns 
the very interaction between the authorities and the strong associations and interest groups 
of the Faroese society. The authorities have learnt to assume a less “senior partner” role 
and have liberated themselves from too close a bond with the significant actors of the 
fishery  industry.  This,  in  turn,  has  made  the  industry  even  more  internationally 
competitive. This is not to say that the economy of the Faroe Islands of today runs without 
disruptions. The fishery industry – and the fishery cluster – is still highly dependent upon 
its export markets and upon a most uncontrollable and fickle resource: the fish.  
A diversification of the Faroese economy has, consequently, been an important strategic 
matter during the whole period of Home Rule. Since the 1980s, the development of a A. Karlsson 
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Faroese oil industry has been investigated. Oil findings under the sea-bed of the United 
Kingdom’s exclusive economic zone bordering the Faroese EEZ mobilized the Faroese 
authorities  –  politically  and  financially  –  some  20  years  ago.  After  long  and  tough 
negotiations with Denmark, the Faroe Islands acquired the rights to all sub-soil and sub-sea 
hydrocarbon deposits within its territory in 1992. Starting in 2001, drillings have been 
made  by  international  oil  corporations  and  there  are  indications  that  substantive 
hydrocarbon accumulations exist. A full commercial exploitation of these, no doubt, would 
altogether change the economic structures of the islands. But some crucial questions need 
to  be  answered  before  a  full-scale,  commercial  hydrocarbon  production  can  become 
reality. Until then, a number of alternative options for the diversification of the Faroese 
economy  are  being  developed.  These  include  a  growing  IT-industry  as  well  as  other 
knowledge intensive services. A newly established ship registry has already found a most 
interesting market segment among small-and medium-sized ship owners on the west coast 
of Sweden.  
Clearly important elements of the economic capacity of the Faroe Islands are their strategic 
foresight and innovative capacity.  
Jurisdictional powers and economic capacity – a dynamic balance and an almost perfect 
match  
The present politico-economic configuration of the Faroe Islands comes close to the idea 
of an ideal-type SNIJ. The inherent dynamism of the constitutional system has created a 
politico-economic configuration almost in balance. The jurisdictional powers have been 
enhanced symbiotically with an increased economic capacity and, vice versa, a gradually 
stronger economic capacity has furthered the national self-confidence that is essential to 
the willingness to take on more jurisdictional powers. The two variables have been cross-
fertilizing one another.  
Faroese  society  has,  over  time,  accumulated  a  remarkable  learning  capacity.  The 
competent  financial  policy  of  today  (learned  the  hard  way  and  not  just  because  of  a 
benevolent patron) supports the economic development of the islands and secures the core 
competency that is crucial to the economy at large. Yesterday´s subsidy policy has been 
replaced by  balanced  financial measures which, in turn,  allow the core competency to 
develop  and  the  fishery  industry  to  become  even  more  competitive.  Today,  the  core 
competency of the economic system of the Faroe Islands is not just based upon skills in the 
fishery trade but is increasingly based on the knowledge of how to preserve a vulnerable 
marine milieu. No doubt, the pragmatic and generous attitude demonstrated by Denmark 
when  allowing  the  Faroe  Islands  to  develop  its  own  important  foreign  networks  and 
associations has contributed significantly to the present adaptation of the core competency.  
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The case of Greenland: Strong Jurisdictional Powers and a Delimited (Independent) 
Economic Capacity  
Jurisdictional powers   
The historical development of Greenlandic society does not demonstrate many similarities 
to Åland or the Faroe Islands. The Home Rule Act of Greenland is, however, a copy of that 
of the Faroe Islands and exhibits the same features of dynamism. In a November 2008 
referendum,  Greenland  took  a  major  step  towards  sovereignty,  a  step  approved  by 
Copenhagen “if this is the will of the people of Greenland”. Still, Greenland has a long 
way to go in order to become an independent economy.   
Greenland  was  a  Danish  colony  up  until  1953  when  it  became  “an  integrated  part  of 
Denmark”, getting the status of a county. In 1979 it was granted its Home Rule within the 
Danish Realm. Between 1972 and 1983, Greenland was a member of the European Union 
(EU)  then  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC);  but  left  the  union  after  a 
referendum. A somewhat curious fact about the Greenlandic secession in 1983 is that it cut 
the territorial size of the EU (EEC) by more than half (Smárason, 2002).  
Even though de jure jurisdictional powers are strong, de facto powers are more restricted. 
The development of Greenlandic society has been fast – too fast some would say – leaving 
the  people,  and  especially  the  original  Inuit  population,  with  institutions  and  political 
structures that are not particularly mobilizing, but rather alienating them. As is the case 
with many a post-colonial society, Greenland is, in an administrative sense, a “replica” of 
the  metropole.  Dahl  (1986),  an  expert  on  Greenlandic  affairs,  has  characterized  the 
administration  of  Greenland  as  “over-developed”  and  emphasized  the  negative 
consequences  of  these  too  sophisticated  and  well-developed  structures.  To  run  its 
administration, Greenland has become dependent upon immigrants from Denmark – well-
educated  Danes  that  have  moved  into  and  occupy  important  positions  within  the 
administrative hierarchy. The gap between the former Danish élite and the Inuit population 
has, during the last few years, become smaller but there is still an uneven distribution of 
income and the clients of the social system of Greenland (a large sector of the public 
economy) are mainly Inuit. The “democratic deficit” that characterizes the everyday life of 
a large portion of the population is a real problem when it comes to the mobilization of the 
de jure jurisdictional powers at hand.  
Culturally and politically, the bonds with the metropole, Denmark, have not always been 
unproblematic.  The  prospects  of  finding  oil  under  the  soil  of  Greenland  have  lead  to 
animated dialogue between Nuuk and Copenhagen from time to time. Rich oil reservoirs 
would solve most of the economic problems of Greenland. An agreement has been reached 
but the oil has not still been exploited. Financially, Greenland is highly dependent upon 
Denmark. An annual lump sum of money is transferred from Denmark to the Home Rule 
authorities  (Landstinget  and  Landsstyret),  the  size  of  which  exceeds  what  would  be 
motivated by the formal agreement that exists between the governments of Denmark and 
Greenland (Karlsson, 2008).  A. Karlsson 
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In  some  areas,  however,  the  de  facto  jurisdictional  powers  clearly  exceed  the  de  jure 
powers. This is especially true when it comes to foreign policy and defence. Denmark has 
given  Greenland  extensive  room  for  manoeuvre  when  it  comes  to  foreign  policy. 
Greenland, like the Faroe Islands, is represented in a number of international associations 
and  networks  and  was,  in  2005,  given  an  unrestricted  right  to  make  international 
agreements  within  areas  that  belong  to  the  Greenlandic  legislative  mandate.  The 
geopolitical position of Greenland is, for a number of reasons - and as history can tell - 
vulnerable. In 2004 a historical agreement, the so called Treaty of Igaliku, was signed by 
the US and Denmark. This treaty on the mutual defence of Greenland was – for the first 
time – signed also by Greenland.  
Gradually,  Greenland  has  strengthened  its  de  jure  jurisdictional  powers.  The  de  facto 
powers are, however, more limited. There are a number of socio-economic problems that 
need to be solved before Greenland can proceed on its path towards sovereignty. One of 
them is the delimited economic capacity of the island.  
Economic capacity  
The economic system of Greenland is, like that of the Faroes, highly dependent upon its 
fishery  industry.  The  Royal  Greenland,  the  biggest  prawn  processing  company  of  the 
world, has its headquarters in Nuuk but is continually out-sourcing parts of its production 
system to other countries. This corporation has been the very hub of the economy during 
the last four decades but a fiercer international competition is today forcing its operations 
out of Greenland. Lower labour costs are found abroad, as well as proximity to consumer 
markets.  
The fishery industry was developed thanks to huge subsidies from Denmark and later on 
from the Home Rule authorities so as to replace the traditional Inuit hunting economy at a 
time when the international demand for whale and seal meat, as well as of skins from a 
variety of Arctic animals had declined. But the (centrally planned) fishery industry has 
never been the carrier of that core competency that is found with its sister industry in the 
Faroe Islands. A strong core competency – which today is about to wane – was, however, 
for several hundred years developed within the Inuit hunting economy. When the Danes 
colonized Greenland in the 18
th century, for instance, the competitive advantages of the 
Inuit production systems were strong enough to give the Danes a chance to force the Dutch 
out of the whaling business. The strong identity that, in the older days, was associated with 
being a hunter has not been transferred to the fishers of today. Fishing is just a way of 
earning a living (Karlsson, 2008).  
The highly concentrated character of its core business makes the Greenlandic economy just 
as vulnerable as that of the Faroe  Islands. The dependency on exports is just as high. 
Promoting the development of new industries that would make the whole economic system 
more diversified is a strategic issue highly prioritized by authorities. Tourism is one sector 
that  is  about  to  develop  even  though  the  high  prices  and  short  season  have  been 
disadvantageous to this sector in the past. The new cold water tourism (Baum et al., 2000),                             Åland, Faroes and Greenland as Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
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however, is expected to change these conditions. Hydrocarbon and minerals explorations 
constitute another potential sector, the growth potential of which is so far unclear.  
An extraordinary feature of the Greenlandic economy is the governance structure of its 
business  sector.  The  most  important  companies  (including  Royal  Greenland)  are  not 
owned privately but by the Home Rule authorities. Greenland embodies, consequently, a 
form of “state capitalism”. Stimulating an in-flow of private capital has been an urgent 
issue for the government for the last decades but, so far, many an attempt has proven 
unsuccessful  (Statistics  Greenland,  2007).  A  shortage  of  both  financial  capital  and 
management competencies has hindered the search for a radical change in the basis of the 
current  economic  system.  One  of  the  aims  of  the  (national  as  well  as  the  regional) 
educational systems is to reduce the shortage of skilled entrepreneurs and managers. In this 
manner, the authorities are trying to replace a centrally controlled development process by 
one that is driven by grass-roots entrepreneurs.   
The economy of Greenland is still rudimentary and its capacity is restricted. One should, 
however, bear in mind that the economy of Greenland was “closed” during the whole 
colonial period and those international stimuli that are found in the cases of Åland and the 
Faroe Islands have not been at hand in the case of Greenland. International networks are a 
late phenomenon in the development of the Greenlandic society and their full potential is 
not yet exploited.  
Jurisdictional  powers  and  economic  capacity  –  problematic  interrelations  and  an 
imperfect match  
As  should  be  clear,  Greenland  can  be  configured  as  a  SNIJ  with  strong  (formal) 
jurisdictional powers but with only a rudimentary economic capacity. About 50 % of the 
GDP of Greenland stems from the annual monetary transfers from Denmark (Statistics 
Greenland, 2007). Although reducing the financial dependency on Denmark is an explicit 
goal, economic structures have to be changed and a truly entrepreneurial climate has to be 
fostered for that goal to be reached. Or it could be that the oil dream might come true… In 
that case, the economic situation would change. But as long as an extensive oil exploitation 
is only planned for the building of a grass-roots economy, this is a more realistic, and a 
more sustainable, way to a greater degree of economic independence. This also implies 
that  the  Home  Rule  authorities  relinquish  their  significant  “senior  partner”  role  in  the 
development of the Greenlandic society.  
A Configurative Comparison of the Three SNIJs.  
In the introductory section of this paper it was suggested that an ideal-type SNIJ can be 
characterized by a good match between jurisdictional powers and economic capacity. The 
study of the three Nordic SNIJs has provided us with one configuration that comes close to 
the ideal-type and with two configurations that deviate from the ideal-type. Figuratively, 
the three SNIJs can be “described” as follows (see Figure 1).  A. Karlsson 
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These schematic configurations offer only a contemporary glimpse of the present politico-
economic realities of the SNIJs and say nothing about the dynamism that is part of their 
historical realities. Still, these schematic configurations can teach us something about the 
challenges that various SNIJs face.  
Figure 1 - Configurative Comparison of the Faroe Islands, Åland Islands and Greenland.  
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Of the three SNIJs under review, the Faroe Islands come closest to an ideal-type SNIJ. In 
this case, one finds an almost perfect match between jurisdictional powers and economic 
capacity and the two variables support one another. They are and have been, throughout 
the history of Faroese Home Rule, symbiotically interrelated. The jurisdictional powers 
have had a positive impact upon the economic capacity and vice versa. In the explanation 
of the latter causality, one must include an intervening variable: national self-confidence. 
Being able to cope with hard times – recessions and economic crises – the Faroese have 
gained  an  incrementally  stronger  self-confidence  which,  in  turn,  has  affected  their 
willingness to take on new political and administrative responsibilities. The most important 
explanation  to  the  Faroese  success  story  is  probably  the  dynamism  of  its  Home  Rule 
construction.  This  has  spurred  a  continual  development  both  on  a  political  and  on  an 
economic level. The jurisdictional powers have been, truly, resourceful. The main strategic 
challenge of the Faroese society is to maintain the present balance.  
In the case of Åland, there is no perfect match. The economic capacity is stronger than the 
jurisdictional  powers  available.  Since  the  jurisdictional  powers  cannot  match  the 
challenges that the core industry – the shipping industry – presently faces, there is a risk 
that this will negatively affect the economic capacity of Åland. A deteriorating shipping 
cluster is a real threat to the state of its overall economy. As long as the shipping industry 
has been able to cope – or rather flourish – on its own, the delimited jurisdictional powers                             Åland, Faroes and Greenland as Sub-National Island Jurisdictions 
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have not constituted a real problem. Today´s fierce international competition, however, 
requires an institutionally beneficial home milieu. The authorities of Finland have not, at 
least not in the past, been willing to provide the shipping cluster of Åland with such a 
milieu. The question is: are the authorities of Åland prepared to start that dialogue with the 
Realm that is required for an enhanced autonomy? And is the Finnish government prepared 
to  consider,  let  alone  entertain,  such  a  dialogue?  The  main  strategic  challenge  of  the 
society of Åland concerns its political entrepreneurship.  
In the case of Greenland there is also an imperfect match. The formal jurisdictional powers 
are  strong  but  the  state  of  the  economy  does  not  make  it  possible  to  fully  “reap  the 
jurisdictional fruits”. Despite a generous Danish attitude, the de facto jurisdictional powers 
are even, at least in some sense, less than the de jure powers. The segregation of the 
Greenlandic society and the deficiency of democracy, when it comes to a large proportion 
of the population, reduce the de facto powers. Still, the jurisdictional powers clearly exceed 
the economic capacity. The huge strategic challenge that the authorities of Greenland face 
is to convert a centralized Home Rule capitalism into a grass roots economy. Developing a 
regionally and locally based entrepreneurship is crucial to the success of this conversion 
and to the creation of indigenous economic capacity.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
In this paper, the divergence between jurisdictional powers and economic capacity has 
been  scrutinized  and  discussed  in  relation  to  the  three  Nordic  sub-national  island 
jurisdictions. The resourcefulness of jurisdictional powers thesis, which is prominent in the 
present island studies debate, has been fleshed out by the empirical experiences of these 
three  Nordic  SNIJs:  Åland,  the  Faroe  Islands  and  Greenland.  An  ideal-type  SNIJ, 
characterized by the balance between jurisdictional powers and economic capacity, has 
been deduced from the literature. This ideal-type has then “guided” the empirical research 
in the search of differentiated SNIJ forms.  
Exploring the differentiated SNIJ population is an important research endeavour since one 
is  likely  to  find  not  one  but  a  number  of  divergent  empirical  expressions  and 
manifestations of “the best of all possible worlds” (Baldacchino, 2006: 680).  
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